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Case No. 880192-CA 
Category 14b 
PETITION 
Pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, plaintiffs-appellants hereby petition the Court for a 
rehearing of this case. The ground for this petition is that 
the Court erred in holding as a matter of law that Neale 
Broadcast Alliance was the prevailing party and thus the only 
party entitled to recover its attorney fees. 
The undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this petition 
is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NEALE BROADCAST ALLIANCE'S COUNTERCLAIM 
DID NOT INCREASE ITS RECOVERY, 
AND IT IS NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY. 
The Court holds, on page 9 of its opinion, that Neale 
Broadcast Alliance (NBA) was the prevailing party because it 
recovered the net judgment. Mountain States respectfully 
submits that this conclusion is in error for at least two 
reasons: First, Mountain States deposited the full amount due 
under the promissory note prior to the time that NBA filed any 
counterclaim. Second, the "net judgment" rule should not be 
applied to a declaratory judgment action where the full amount 
of the note was not due when suit was filed, where the plaintiff 
deposited the full amount due into court, and where not all of 
the amount "recovered" by defendant was disputed. 
Mountain States1 deposited the entire unpaid balance due 
under the promissory note into court, and sought a declaratory 
judgment that Mountain States was entitled to certain offsets 
and claimed that NBA had breached certain other obligations 
under the contracts. NBA's Counterclaim sought (1) payment of 
the amount due under the note, which Mountain States had already 
deposited into court, and (2) punitive damages of $50,000.00. 
The judgment in this case awarded certain offsets to 
Mountain States, and ordered that the corrected balance due 
under the promissory note be paid to NBA, all in accordance with 
Mountain States1 complaint. NBA was denied the affirmative 
2 
relief it sought, in that its request for punitive damages was 
denied. 
Based on these facts, this Court held that NBA had a net 
recovery of approximately $85,000, and that NBA was the prevail-
ing party. 
Carried to its logical extreme, the rule established by 
this Court would also mean that NBA would have been the prevail-
ing party even if Mountain States had established a right to an 
$89,000 offset, yielding a net judgment to NBA of $1,000.00. 
The rule in essence means that the payor under a promissory note 
can never be a prevailing party in litigation under the note. 
Several factors dictate that such a mechanical rule should 
not be applied in this case. First, although Mountain States 
deposited the entire unpaid balance into court at the time it 
filed its complaint, the note was not then due.1 The note was 
amortized over ten years, with the final payment due June 30, 
1992. 
A second factor is that Mountain States deposited the 
unpaid balance into court at the time it filed its complaint, 
and not in response to a counterclaim from NBA. 
In Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034 
(Utah 1981) , the case relied upon by the Court in this case as 
XNBA asserted in its Answer and Counterclaim that it had 
declared the entire unpaid balance to be due. There was no 
evidence that NBA had accelerated the note prior to the time 
that Mountain States made its deposit. (Three notices of 
default were admitted into evidence, but none purport to 
accelerate the note. (Exhibits 71, 78, 79.) 
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support for the proposition that money voluntarily paid during 
litigation should be treated as obtained by judgment, the facts 
were much different. The Court there stated as follows: 
Highland claims to be "the prevailing 
party" because 164 days after it filed this 
action and while this action was pending in 
the court below, Stevenson admitted that he 
owed and he voluntarily paid Highland 
$10,300.78 of the amount it was suing for. 
. . . It should make no difference whether 
the plaintiff recovers money from the 
defendant during the course of the action by 
voluntary payment or whether the plaintiff 
recovers that amount by a judgment. In both 
instances the plaintiff has recovered money 
by virtue of its action. See Joseph Maanin 
Co., Inc. v. Schmidt, 152 Cal.Rptr. 523, 89 
C.A.3d Supp. 7 (1978). In the instant case, 
the $10,3 00.78 was long past due when paid 
by Stevenson and since it was paid, albeit 
voluntarily, after plaintiff's action was 
commenced the plaintiff Highland was indeed 
the prevailing party" on that particular 
cause of action. 
636 P.2d at 1038. In Joseph Macrnin, cited in Highland, it 
similarly appears that the debt was past due at the time suit 
was filed, and the award of attorney fees was based on a 
specific statute somewhat similar to Utah R. Civ. P. 68(a). 
In the instant case, in contrast, the sums paid by Mountain 
States were not "voluntarily" paid during the pendency of the 
suit—they were paid before suit, at the time the complaint was 
filed. In addition, the sums were not "long past due," but in 
fact would not have become due for several years. Mountain 
States attempted to show its good faith by depositing the full 
balance due into court. Such deposits should be encouraged as a 
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matter of policy. Under this Court's ruling, there would be no 
incentive to make such a deposit. 
The "net judgment" rule may be appropriate in cases similar 
to those cited by this Court in support of the rule. For 
example, in Ocean West Contractors, Inc. v. Halec Construction 
Co. , 123 Ariz. 470, 600 P.2d 1102 (1979), the plaintiff (sub-
contractor) sued the defendant (general contractor) for the 
unpaid balance claimed to be due under a construction sub-
contract, and the defendant counterclaimed for damages for the 
plaintiff's failure to complete the subcontract. The trial 
court found that the plaintiff had breached the contract first, 
but awarded both parties some relief. The net judgment was in 
favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was therefore awarded 
its costs and attorney fees. 
In Ocean West, therefore, and in the other cases cited by 
this Court in support of the "net judgment" rule, the claims 
arose out of the same transaction, but were dissimilar. (The 
plaintiff sued for the unpaid balance due; the defendant sued 
for damages for failure to complete.) In the instant case, in 
contrast, the defendant's "counterclaim" was identical to 
plaintiffs' complaint. With the exception of defendant's claim 
for punitive damages, defendant did not seek any relief which 
was not inherent in plaintiff's complaint. 
Plaintiffs in this case obtained a judgment that they were 
entitled to some offsets, although the offsets were not as great 
as claimed. Defendant was awarded a judgment, but only for that 
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which had been offered in plaintiffs1 complaint—payment of the 
promissory note less offsets.2 Plaintiffs were the prevailing 
party, and should be awarded their attorney fees, 
CONCLUSION 
The "net judgment11 rule should not be applied to a declara-
tory judgment action seeking a determination of offsets against 
a promissory note, where the unpaid balance, although not then 
due, is deposited in court at the inception of the lawsuit. NBA 
recovered nothing by its counterclaim—the relief it received 
was inherent in Mountain States' complaint. 
This Court should grant the petition for rehearing, and 
should determine that plaintiff was the prevailing party as a 
matter of law. 
DATED this 5th day of July, 1989. 
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
2As shown on the attached amortization schedule, the amount 
deposited into court actually overpaid the promissory note. 
Mountain States should be entitled to a refund from NBA. 
This amortization is based on the fact that the entire 
$89,587.16 was deposited in court at the time the complaint was 
filed in May, 1983. Although the trial court treated $30,000.00 
of the total as having been deposited in January, 1984, the 
$30,000.00 paid in January, 1984, was not new money, but just 
replaced the check which had been deposited earlier. (The trial 
court's findings on this issue conflict. Finding no. 24 states 
the $30,000.00 was paid on July 24, 1984. Finding no. 27 states 
the $30,000.00 was paid on January 25, 1984. (R. 318-19.)) The 
check for $89,587.16 was not withdrawn until after the 
$30,000.00 had been deposited. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co, v. Neale, 
Case No, 880192-CA, slip op. (Utah Ct. App. June 20, 1989). 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Mountain States Broadcasting 
Company/ a corporation/ and 
Dan Lacy, an individual/ 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants and 
Cross-Respondents/ 
v. 
Sterrett Neale and Neale 
Broadcast Alliance/ 
Defendants, Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants• 
Fourth District/ Utah County 
The Honorable Boyd L. Park 
Attorneys: Don R. Petersen, Leslie W. Slaugh# Provo, for 
Appellants 
Stephen L. Henriod/ Marilynn P. Fineshriber/ Salt 
Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Davidson, Greenwood, and Orme. 
ORME/ Judge: 
This appeal arises from a dispute over the purchase of 
two radio stations and their assets. Mountain States 
Broadcasting Company/ the corporate purchaser/ and Dan Lacy, 
Mountain States' president and guarantor of the promissory note 
given for the purchase price, commenced this action seeking a 
declaration of their entitlement to certain offsets against the 
note balance otherwise due. Neale Broadcast Alliance ("NBA"), 
the corporate seller, and Sterrett Neale, NBA's president and 
guarantor of the seller's performance, were named as 
defendants. NBA counterclaimed for the entire note balance. 
Both parties successfully secured certain aspects of the relief 
they sought, but now appeal various decisions of the trial 
court. We affirm in substantial part, but reverse and remand 
in limited respects. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880192-CA 
FILED 
'NOOOMI 
f t * Court 
U*r» Court •* Apptrtt 
FACTS 
NBA owned and operated radio stations KONI and KTMP in 
Utah County. On November 21, 1981, NBA agreed to sell these 
stations to Mountain States,, and the parties entered into an 
Asset Purchase Agreement. In June 1982, the sale transaction 
closed and Mountain States delivered a promissory note for the 
deferred portion of the purchase price to NBA. The purchase 
agreement provided that NBA warranted "all of the personal 
property listed in Schedule 2 which is presently in active use 
in the operation of the Stations will be in good repair and 
working order unless otherwise noted" on the schedule. 
Following the closing, Dan Lacy inspected the premises of both 
radio stations and the personal property found thereon. Lacy 
compiled a list of items mentioned on Schedule 2 that were, in 
his opinion, either missing or inoperable. Accordingly, 
Mountain States claimed a substantial offset against the note 
balance. 
After making two small payments on the note, Mountain 
States and Lacy brought this action seeking a judicial 
determination of their entitlement to the claimed offsets for 
the allegedly missing or inoperable equipment. Mountain States 
deposited a check for $89,587.16, the balance then due on the 
note, with the court.1 NBA disputed the propriety of any 
offset and counterclaimed for the entire amount due and owing 
on the note, including interest. 
Following a bench trial, the court found that the items 
claimed to be missing were either excluded from the sale or had 
been found, so that "no material items" were missing. However, 
the court found that a "control design brain" and two carousels 
used in the operation of the stations were not in "good repair 
and working order" at the time of transfer. Accordingly, the 
court awarded Mountain States an offset of $6,000, the 
approximate amount the court concluded was necessary to restore 
those items to the condition warranted. 
NBA was awarded a judgment on its counterclaim for the 
entire amount due on the note, less the offset. Relying on 
1. At a subsequent hearing convened for another purpose, it 
was agreed that the trial court would return this check to 
Mountain States, which would then immediately pay $59,587.16 to 
NBA and deposit the remaining $30,000 to an interest-bearing 
account pending resolution of the dispute. 
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language in the promissory note, the court concluded that 
interest due on the unpaid balance should be compounded 
monthly. Finding each side had prevailed to some extent, the 
trial court also awarded both sides their attorney fees in 
full. 
On appeal, Mountain States claims: 1) It is entitled to 
further offsets against the purchase price to compensate for 
missing or inoperable equipment or to reflect the proper 
measure of damages; 2) the court erred in compounding the 
interest on unpaid interest installments; and 3) the court 
erred in awarding both sides attorney fees because only 
plaintiffs were "the prevailing party" as contemplated by the 
purchase agreement.2 
NBA cross-appeals, challenging the propriety of any 
offset and claiming that they, not plaintiffs, are entitled to 
attorney fees as "the prevailing party." 
MISSING AND INOPERABLE EQUIPMENT 
The parties1 claims concerning the proper offset amount 
are essentially a challenge to the trial court's findings of 
fact. Specifically, Mountain States argues the findings 
concerning the amounts attributable to missing and inoperable 
equipment are not supported by the evidence but are instead 
significantly higher. NBA argues the evidence does not support 
the findings in support of even a $6000 offset. 
2. Mountain States also claims the trial court erred by 
denying its claim for consequential damages relating to extra 
payroll expense incurred by reason of the control design 
brain's "inoperable" condition. We agree with the trial court 
that Mountain States failed to meet its burden of proving that, 
but for the condition of the control design brain, those 
expenses would not have been necessary. 
Mountain States also objects to the trial court's 
post-trial amendment of the judgment to permit disbursement of 
the deposited funds to Sterrett Neale personally rather than 
directly to NBA. The court granted the motion to amend the 
judgment ex parte, apparently regarding this modification as 
merely clerical in nature. While we agree that the court 
should have allowed Mountain States sufficient time to respond 
to the motion, its failure to do so is harmless error in light 
of our decision favorable to defendants. 
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In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact/ a 
party -must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence,• thus making them "clearly 
erroneous.'- In re Bartell. 105 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1989) 
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). See also, e.g., Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 
465, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Appellants often overlook or 
disregard this heavy burden. When the duty to marshal is not 
properly discharged, we refuse to consider the merits of 
challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid. 
See, e.g.. Deeben v. Deeben. 106 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 57 n.l 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 
963 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); West Vallev Citv v. Borreoo, 752 P.2d 
361, 364-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 
744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Harker v. Condominiums 
Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Here, the parties have done an admirable job of marshaling the 
evidence. Indeed, the benefits of the requirement are 
demonstrated by the fact that Mountain States, after its . 
careful review of the evidence, candidly concedes the adequacy 
of the evidence to support the. findings as to all but five of 
its original claims for missing or inoperable equipment. 
Furthermore, Mountain States' five remaining challenges are 
well supported by precise and thorough references to record 
evidence supporting the particular finding as well as evidence 
supporting Mountain States' challenge. Accordingly, we turn to 
the merits of those challenges. 
After carefully reviewing the marshalled evidence, we 
conclude the trial court's factual findings regarding the 
alleged missing equipment are sufficiently supported by the 
evidence, with only two minor exceptions. We have been shown 
no evidence on which the trial court could have relied in 
denying the claims for the missing oscilloscope and a noise and 
distortion meter. Thus, we hold on the undisputed evidence in 
the record that Mountain States is entitled to additional 
offsets in the amount of $120 for the oscilloscope and $377.80 
for the noise and distortion meter. 
Additionally, both Mountain States and NBA challenge the 
trial court's findings supporting its award of damages to 
Mountain States for inoperable equipment. The evidence readily 
supports the majority of the findings in this regard, but those 
concerning the control design brain and two carousels present 
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closer questions. Mountain States claims the $3/000 award 
based on the cost to repair the control design brain is 
insufficient as the evidence demonstrates that the brain is 
beyond repair. Thus, Mountain States contends replacement cost 
is the appropriate measure of its damages. On the other hand, 
NBA contends the evidence demonstrates the control design brain 
and carousels were as warranted and the court should not have 
awarded any such damages to Mountain States. 
The court received a wide range of testimony regarding 
the condition of the control design brain and carousels. 
However, the evidence does not compel a finding that the 
equipment was beyond repair, as Mountain States contends, nor 
that it was in the condition warranted at the time of sale, as 
NBA contends. The middle ground taken by the trial .court, 
namely that this equipment was not as warranted but could be 
repaired, has ample evidentiary support. Of course, in view of 
the divergent positions taken by the parties at trial, the 
evidence concerning repair costs is somewhat sparse. It 
appears that in formulating its ultimate award, the court 
relied on an evaluation report prepared by an electronics 
technician suggesting approximate repair costs.3 The award 
is consistent with the estimates contained in the report. 
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to support the court's award 
to Mountain States of a $6000 offset for equipment in 
disrepair, and we affirm it. 
INTEREST 
Mountain States next contends the trial court erred in 
awarding compound interest to NBA on the unpaid interest 
3. Hoping to persuade us to adopt replacement cost as the 
measure of its damages, Mountain States argues this document 
should not be considered by us because it was not admitted as 
evidence of repair costs. However, our attention is drawn to 
no indication in the record that the court admitted the 
document for a limited purpose, nor to any objection by 
Mountain States to the document's admission for particular 
purposes. In view of our affirmation of repair cost as the 
appropriate measure of damages in this case, we note that if 
this evidence were disregarded, this offset in favor of 
Mountain States would have to be set aside altogether. No 
other evidence in the record bears on the cost to repair this 
equipment. 
880192-CA 5 
installments. See generally 45 Am.Jur.2d Interest and Usury 
§ 76 (1969) (-Compound interest means interest on interest, in 
that accrued interest is added periodically to the principal, 
and interest is computed upon the new principal thus formed; it 
is to be distinguished from the mere allowance of interest on 
overdue installments of interest/ which is not strictly 
compound interest.-). The court relied on the following 
provision in the promissory note as the basis for its award: 
This Note shall bear interest upon 
the unpaid principal balance hereof from 
the date hereof until paid, at a rate of 
ten percent (10%) per annum. Should 
interest not be paid when due, it shall 
thereafter bear like interest as the 
principal. 
In Utah/ compound interest is not favored by the law. 
Watkins & Faber v. Whitelev, 592 P.2d 613/ 616 (Utah 1979) (per 
curiam). The court1s award here can be affirmed only if we 
conclude the parties expressly agreed to compound interest by 
the terms of the above provision. In this regard/ we observe 
that the note does not explicitly provide that interest on 
unpaid interest should be compounded monthly.4 Instead/ it 
provides that unpaid interest will bear interest "as the 
principal/- which bears simple interest. Therefore/ we hold 
NBA is only entitled to simple interest at a rate of 10% per 
annum on the unpaid interest installments/ and we remand to the 
trial court to recalculate the interest due.5 
4. ££. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961(b) (1989) (expressly providing for 
interest -compounded annually-). 
5. A close reading of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320/ 145 
P. 1036 (1915)/ relied on by NBA# reveals the Court's intention 
that the unpaid interest earn interest/ but it is not clear it 
intended the interest upon the interest to bear interest. T£. 
at 1041. The interpretation favoring simple interest is 
supported by the overall result in Jensen. The interest 
payments in that case were $175 per month. The Court said: 
When therefore the several sums of $175/ 
with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per 
cent per annum from the date they 
severally became due until the judgment 
was entered as aforesaid, are all added to 
880192-CA 6 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Mountain States and NBA also challenge the trial court's 
award granting both sides their attorney fees based on the 
attorney fee provision in the Asset Purchase Agreement.6 
That provision provides in part, with our emphasis, as follows: 
In the event of commencement of suit by 
either party to enforce the provisions of 
this Agreement, £hg prevailing party shall 
be entitled to receive attorneys' fees and 
costs as a court may adjudge reasonable in 
addition to any other relief granted. 
Attorney fees are awardable only if provided for by statute 
or contract and, if by contract, only as the contract allows by 
its terms. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
(Footnote 5 continued) 
the principal, the total amount is the 
amount for which judgment should be 
entered. 
Id. If the Court had intended the missed interest installments 
to bear compounded interest, these particular installments 
would have been added to the principal once overdue, rather 
than making sure they existed as "several sums of $175" and 
waiting until judgment to add them to the principal. 
Furthermore, the provision in Jensen is distinguishable from 
the provision at issue here. 
6. There are actually three attorney fee provisions in the 
record. The individual guaranty of Dan Lacy provides that Lacy 
will "reimburse Neale for all costs and expenses including 
attorney's fees incurred in the enforcement of this guaranty." 
Since the trial court had no occasion to award NBA a judgment 
on the guaranty, we need not consider this provision. 
The promissory note also provides that "[t]he undersigned 
[Mountain States] promises to pay costs of collection and 
attorneys' fees in reasonable amount if default is made in the 
payment of this Note." Because NBA is the party due fees under 
this provision and also, as we will explain, the "prevailing 
party" under the fees provision in the purchase agreement, we 
need not separately consider the note provision, which is 
merely duplicative given the posture of this case. 
880192-CA 7 
985, 988 (Utah 1988). As the award of fees here is based on a 
contract, we must determine if the trial court properly 
concluded that both parties "prevailed- and were therefore 
entitled to fees under the contract. Both sides argue the fee 
provision mandates that there can be only one -prevailing 
party,- an interpretation consistent with the plain meaning of 
the provision, particularly its reference in the singular to 
"the prevailing party.- Of course, both claim to be that 
party. 
Typically, determining the -prevailing party- for purposes 
of awarding fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues 
defendant for money damages; if plaintiff is awarded a 
judgment, plaintiff has prevailed, and if defendant 
successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment, defendant 
has prevailed. However, this simple analysis cannot* be 
employed here because both plaintiff and defendant obtained 
some monetary relief against the other.7 Our review of the 
relevant case law convinces us that under the provision at 
issue, there can be only one prevailing party even though both 
plaintiff and defendant are awarded money damages on claims 
arising from the same transaction.8 See Lawrence v. Peel, 45 
7. The determination of a -prevailing party- becomes even more 
complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties, see 
Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Constr. Co.. 152 Ariz. 455, 733 
P.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1986); the granting of non-monetary relief 
to one or more parties, see Watson Constr. Co. v. Amfac 
Mortgage Corp.. 124 Ariz. 570, 606 P.2d 421, 435-36 (Ct. App. 
1979); Food Pantrv, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc.. 58 
Haw. 606, 575 P.2d 869, 879 (1978); and where the ultimate 
award of money daraagfes does not adequately represent the actual 
success of the parties under the peculiar posture of the case. 
&£2 Owen Jones & Sons. Inc. v. C.R. Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312, 
313-14 (Alaska 1972). These cases demonstrate the need for a 
flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases 
who actually is the -prevailing party.-
8. It appears that where both plaintiff and defendant recover 
in the same action but the counterclaim does not arise from the 
same transaction as the plaintiff's claim, both parties may be 
considered to have prevailed and, therefore, to be entitled to 
a portion of their fees. See, e.g., Elder v. Triax Co., 740 
P.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Utah 1987); Moran v. Lewis, 131 Conn. 680, 
41 A.2d 905, 905 (1945). However, this rule would not apply 
here because Mountain States' claim and NBA's counterclaim 
arose from the same transaction. 
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Or. App. 233, 607 P.2d 1386, 1392 (1980); Marauam Inv. Corp. v. 
Mvers, 35 Or. App. 23, 581 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1978). See also 
Checketts v. Collinas, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 950, 953 (Utah 1931) 
("There can be but one prevailing party in an action at law to 
recover a money judgment.-).9 But see Travner v. Cushino, 
688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (both sides entitled 
to award of some attorney fees where relevant agreement did not 
employ -prevailing party" phraseology). We hold that in the 
present circumstances the party in whose favor the -net-
judgment is entered must be considered the -prevailing party" 
and is entitled to an award of its fees. See, e.g., Ocean West 
Contractors. Inc. v. Halec Constr. Co.. 123 Ariz. 470, 600 P.2d 
1102, 1105 (1979); Trollooe v. Koerner, 21 Ariz. App. 43, 515 
P.2d 340, 344 (1973); Moss Constr. Co. v. Wulffsohn, 116 Cal. 
App. 2d 203, 253 P.2d 483, 485 (1953); Szoboszlay v. Glessner. 
233 Kan. 475, 664 P.2d 1327, 1333-35 (1983); E.C.A. Envtl. 
Management Servs., Inc. v. Toenves, 208 Mont. 336, 679 P.2d 
213, 218 (1984). £££ slS& Annotation, Who XS The -Successful 
Party" Or "Prevailing Party" For Purposes Of Awarding Costs 
Where Both Parties Prevail On Affirmative Claims, 66 A.L.R.3d 
1115 (1975). 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that NBA, in view of 
its net recovery of approximately $85,000, is the sole 
"prevailing party" as a matter of law. Accordingly, we reverse 
the award of fees to Mountain States. Even though we affirm 
NBA's entitlement to an award of attorney fees, we must reverse 
the award as made and remand for a determination of a 
reasonable fee.10 sss floss Cogstr, Cot/ 253 P.2d at 484-85. 
9. We note the limited reliance we purposefully place on 
Checketts. While we agree that there can be but one 
"prevailing party* in an action such as this, we think that the 
result reached in Checketts, to the effect that a defendant who 
defeats a plaintiff's claim, but also loses on its 
counterclaim, is the "prevailing party" entitled to fees as a 
matter of course, 1 P.2d at 953, makes little sense and is 
probably no longer valid. 
10. The trial court in this case, in awarding fees to both 
sides, simply awarded each the total amount of its accumulated 
billing statements. *On remand, the trial court's calculation 
of a reasonable fee should comport with Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Utah 1988). Of course, a 
reasonable fee will compensate NBA only for those fees 
necessarily incurred in resolution of issues in NBA's favor, 
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Finally, plaintiffs argue that they acknowledged owing a 
portion of the debt both before the action was commenced and, 
subsequently, at an early stage of the action. See note 1, 
supra. Additionally, they note that they deposited the entire 
sum due into court. Accordingly, plaintiffs contend NBA cannot 
be deemed to have "prevailed," at least as to the amount never 
seriously contested by Mountain States. We cannot agree, and 
hold that NBA has "prevailed" to the extent of its entire 
recovery, including the amount Mountain States voluntarily paid 
after NBA filed its counterclaim. See Highland Constr. Co. v. 
Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981) (for purposes of an 
award of fees to the "prevailing party," sums voluntarily paid 
during the course of the action are treated as if obtained by 
judgment). ££. Maher v. Gacrne. 448 U.S. 122, 100 S. Ct. 2570, 
2575 (1980) (a party has "prevailed" for purposes of awarding 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 even if resolution of its claim is 
through settlement). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's $6,000 award to Mountain States as an 
offset for missing or inoperable equipment is affirmed, but 
must be increased by $120 for the missing oscilloscope and 
$377.80 for the missing noise and distortion meter. The 
court's award of compound interest is reversed. Finally, the 
court's award of attorney fees to both parties is reversed. On 
remand, then, the trial court must determine and enter an award 
of reasonable attorney fees in NBA's favor, increase the offset 
in favor of Mountain States as indicated, and recalculate 
interest to award NBA only simple interest on the interest 
(Footnote 10 continued) 
and should not include fees relating to the issues resolved in 
Mountain States' favor. Sg£ Stacev Properties v. Wixen, 766 
P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (party entitled to 
attorney fees "was entitled to attorney fees for the claims on 
which it was successful"). ££. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, 
Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1079-80 
(Utah 1988) (suggesting need to "differentiate between the time 
spent on the successful claim[s] and the time spent on 
unsuccessful claims" and propriety of awarding fees only for 
the former); Travner v. Cushina, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) 
(per curiam) ("[A] party is entitled only to those fees 
attributable to the successful vindication of contractual 
rights within the terms of their agreement."). 
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installments not paid when due. Additionally, NBA, while not 
enjoying total success on this appeal, is clearly the 
"prevailing party," and is entitled on remand to an award of 
its attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.11 See 
Management Servs. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 
(Utah 1980). 
Gregoiar K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
C^L/(Z 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
11. Of course, the point made in footnote 10 about the 
recoverable aspects of NBAfs overall attorney fee applies with 
equal force to the reasonable fee awardable on remand for 
attorney services rendered on appeal. 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Amortization Schedule 
MOUNTAIN STATES BROADCASTING COPRORATION 
rvTS 
NEALLE BROADCAST ALLIANCE 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE — 
Orxginal Note Amount 
Court Directed Offset 
New Note Amount 
$90,929.99 
6,497.00 
$84,432.99 
TERM OF LOAN — 120 Months INTEREST RATE — 10% Per Annum 
Date 
7-30-32 
^ 30 davs 
8-30-82' 
9-30-82 
10-1-82 
10-30-82 
(30 days 
11-30-82 
12-1-82 
12-30-82 
(30 days 
1-30-83 
2-28-83 
3-30-83 
4-30-83 
5-5-83 
(6 days < 
5-5-33 
5-5-84 
5-5-85 
5-5-86 
5-5-87 
5-5-88 
5-5-89 
7-1-89 
at 
at 
at 
at 
d^d Interest 
703.50 
23.45/day,> 
703.50 
703.50 
701.10 
23.37/day) 
701.10 
702.90 
23.43/day) 
702.90 
702.90 
702.90 
702.90 
140.58 
23.43/day) 
159.13 
175.05 
192.55 
211.81 
232.99 
256.29 
42.90 
Subtract Payments 
2,403.30 
1,201.65 
89,587.16 
Balance 
85,136.49 
35,839.99 
86,543.49 
84,140.19 
84,841.29 
85,542.39 
84,340.74 
85,043.64 
85,746.54 
86,449.44 
87,152.34 
87,855.24 
87,995.82 
( 1,591.34 ) 
( 1,750.47 ) 
( 1,925.52 ) 
( 2,118.07 ) 
( 2,329.88 ) 
( 2,562.87 ) 
( 2,819.16 ) 
( 2,862.06 ) 
(55 days at $.78/day) 
Interest accrues thru 5-5-90 at $.78/day or $23.40/month 
